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Insurance
by Stephen L. Cotter
Stephen M. Schatz*
and Bradley S. Wolff**
I.

INTRODUCTION

This survey year, from June 1, 2009 to May 31, 2010,1 brought
significant developments to a broad array of insurance fields. Both the
Georgia Supreme Court and the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit held that a cancellation notice for nonpayment of a
premium can also contain an offer to reinstate upon payment in the
"grace" period. The supreme court has strictly enforced basic concepts
of "offer and acceptance" in the context of time-limit policy demands
containing less than complete release and indemnity terms, thereby
appearing to put insurers in "catch 22" situations with their insureds.
A "safe harbor" is getting more difficult to find. An oral reservation of
rights can be valid, but an insurer's failure to sufficiently reserve its
rights, while undertaking the insured's, waives those rights. Complex

* Partner in the firm of Swift, Currie, McGhee & Hiers, Atlanta, Georgia. Mercer
University (B.A., 1971); Mercer University, Walter F. George School of Law (J.D., cum
laude, 1974). Member, Mercer Law Review (1973-1974). Member, State Bar of Georgia;
American Bar Association; Georgia Defense Lawyers Association; Defense Research
Institute; International Association of Defense Counsel.
** Managing Partner in the firm of Swift, Currie, McGhee & Hiers, Atlanta, Georgia.
University ofVirginia (B.A., with distinction, 1985); University of North Carolina at Chapel
Hill School of Law (J.D., 1988). Member, State Bar of Georgia (Member, Tort and
Insurance Practice and Litigation Section); Defense Research Institute.
*** Partner in the firm of Swift, Currie, McGhee & Hiers, Atlanta, Georgia. Vanderbilt
University (B.A., cum laude, 1983); University of Georgia School of Law (J.D., cum laude,
1986). Member, State Bar of Georgia; Defense Research Institute; International
Association of Defense Counsel.
1. For analysis of Georgia insurance law during the prior survey period, see Bradley
S. Wolff, Stephen L. Cotter & Stephen M. Schatz, Insurance,Annual Survey of Georgia
Law, 61 MERCER L. REv. 179 (2009).
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preemption issues were addressed in various courts, perhaps heralding
more to come from recent attempts to federalize health insurance.
II.

AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE

During the survey period, the courts decided several cases important
to practitioners handling automobile cases. Among these are decisions
involving the issues of who is an "insured," how many "accidents" arise
out of multiple impacts, and the effect of a limited release on an
uninsured motorist carrier's (UMC) right to subrogation. We begin with
a discussion of the uninsured motorist (UM) cases, focusing on previously unexplored questions addressed in cases involving UM coverage.
A.

Uninsured Motorist Coverage
1.

Who Is an "Insured" in a Policy Issued to a Corpor-

ation? We discussed in last year's article the court of appeals decision
in Staton v. State Farm Automobile Insurance Co.,' which allowed the
stacking of policies issued to a corporation.? The Georgia Supreme
Court granted certiorari in State FarmMutualAutomobile Insurance Co.
v. Staton' and reversed the court of appeals decision.'
Staton was driving a vehicle owned and insured by Smyth & Helwys
Publishing, Inc. (Smyth & Helwys), his employer, when he was injured
in a car wreck. State Farm insured this vehicle and two other vehicles
owned by Smyth & Helwys. The UM policy limit for each vehicle was
$100,000. Staton wanted to stack all three policies to recover up to
$300,000 in UM coverage.? State Farm argued that Staton could not
stack the policies because he was not the "named insured" on any of the
policies.' The insurance policies stated that the named insured was the
"first person named" on the declarations page.? The first and only name
on the declarations page was the corporation's name, Smyth & Helwys.9
The court of appeals held that Staton could stack the policies because
Staton was the named insured on all three policies."o The court
reasoned that the term "named insured" was ambiguous because "(1) the

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

294 Ga. App. 208, 669 S.E.2d 164 (2008).
Id. at 213, 669 S.E.2d at 168; see also Wolff et al., supra note 1, at 187-88.
286 Ga. 23, 23, 685 S.E.2d 263, 264 (2009).
Id. at 26, 685 S.E.2d at 266.
Id. at 23-24, 685 S.E.2d at 264.
Id. at 24, 685 S.E.2d at 264-65.
Id. at 24, 685 S.E.2d at 265.
Id. at 23-24, 685 S.E.2d at 264-65.
Id. at 24, 685 S.E.2d at 265.
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'named insured' was defined as 'the first person named in the declarations'; (2) the policy defined a 'person' as a 'human being'; and (3) Smyth
& Helwys, the corporate entity named as insured on the declarations
page, was not a human being."" The court held that Staton was a
named insured because Staton was the first person identified in the
declarations-he was named as the first licensed driver. The court also
held that the evidence showed Staton reasonably expected the policies
to be stacked.'
In a 5-2 decision, the supreme court reversed the court of appeals and
rejected its analysis." The majority opinion which was written by
Justice Thompson, held "that the term 'named insured' is not ambiguous."' In reaching its decision, the supreme court explored general
rules of contract interpretation." For example, one rule of contract
interpretation that the court explored is that an ambiguity exists if a
term is "subject to more than one reasonable interpretation. 1 6
Furthermore, if an ambiguity exists, it will be construed against the
insurer. 7 However, when only one reasonable construction of the
language is possible, there is no ambiguity, and the contract must be
interpreted as written."8 Under these rules, the supreme court held
that the term "named insured" was not ambiguous because only "Smyth
& Helwys" appeared on the declarations page, which made it clear that
Smyth & Helwys was the named insured.'
The court further explained that written words, such as the name appearing in the
declarations, prevail when they conflict with preprinted portions of
policies, such as the definition of "person" as a "human being."'
Justice Carley and Chief Justice Hunstein dissented and argued in favor
of affirming the court of appeals decision.2'
One month after the decision was issued in Staton, in Banks v.
Brotherhood Mutual Insurance Co.,22 the court of appeals applied the

11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 25-26, 685 S.E.2d at 265-66.
14. Id. at 25, 685 S.E.2d at 266.
15. See id. at 25-26, 685 S.E.2d at 265-66.
16. Id. at 25, 685 S.E.2d at 265.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 25, 685 S.E.2d at 266 (quoting Cotton States Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bowden, 136
Ga. App. 499, 500, 221 S.E.2d 832, 833 (1975)).
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 26, 685 S.E.2d at 266 (Carley, P.J., dissenting).
22. 301 Ga. App. 101, 686 S.E.2d 872 (2009).
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supreme court's Staton holding.' Banks, a City of Toccoa (City)
employee and the pastor of a church, was injured in an automobile
collision while driving a service truck owned by the City. Banks
recovered workers' compensation benefits from the City and sought to
recover UM coverage from Brotherhood Mutual Insurance, which insured
a church van that Banks was permitted to drive. The insurance policy's
declarations page listed "Hollywood Church of God Inc." as the named
insured." The policy provided that "[ilf the named insured is '[a]
partnership, limited liability company, corporation or any other form of
organization,' then anyone occupying the covered vehicle is insured."'
Banks argued that the named insured, Hollywood Church of God Inc.,
was a nonexistent entity and that an ambiguity therefore existed as to
who the named insured was." Banks cited the general rule that all
ambiguities must be construed against the insurer and construed
liberally to provide coverage, and argued that pursuant to this rule he
should be considered the named insured under the policy."
The court of appeals determined that under the terms of the policy,
which read that "[ilf the Named Insured is designated in the Declarations as ... [a] form of organization, then ... [alnyone occuping a

covered auto" is to be considered an insured, the term "organization" was
to be assigned its dictionary meaning." The court further held that the
church could be considered "a form of organization"; thus, the court
determined that the policy was clearly intended to show that the church
Accordingly, because Banks was not
was the named insured.'
occupying the insured vehicle at the time of the incident, he was not
entitled to UM coverage under the policy.'
2. Limited Release Does Not Affect Subrogation Rights of a
Carrier. A decision on the question involved in Ramos-Silva v. State
Farm Mutual Insurance Co."' has been long awaited. The limited
liability release statute32 was enacted in 1992, 3 but it took until 2009

23. See id. at 102-03, 686 S.E.2d at 874-75.
24. Id. at 101-02, 686 S.E.2d at 874.
25. Id. at 102, 686 S.E.2d at 874 (second alteration in original).
26. Id
27. Id. at 103, 686 S.E.2d at 874-75.
28. Id. at 103-04, 686 S.E.2d at 875 (first alteration in original).
29. Id. at 104, 686 S.E.2d at 875.
30. Id.
31. 300 Ga. App. 699, 686 S.E.2d 345 (2009).
32. O.C.G.A. § 33-24-41.1 (2005).
33. Ga. H.R. Bill, Reg. Sess., § 1, 1992 Ga. Laws 2514, 2514-16 (codified at O.C.G.A.
§ 33-24-41.1).
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to get an answer as to whether an injured party's release of a tortfeasor
precludes subrogation against the tortfeasor by the injured person's
UMC.34
The question at issue in Ramos-Silva arises because a limited liability
release acts as a personal release of the tortfeasor, thus the release only
allows additional claims to be prosecuted by the injured person against
insurance carriers.35 However, pursuant to section 33-7-11(f) of the
Official Code of Georgia Annotated (O.C.G.A.)," a UMC that pays its
insured is entitled to subrogation against the tortfeasor." Since a
subrogation claim requires the UMC to "'stand[] in the shoes' of [its]
insured,"' and because the insured injured party is precluded from any
3
the
recovery from the tortfeasor after executing a limited release,"
limited release may have the effect of precluding a UMC's subrogation
claim. However, in Ramos-Silva, the court of appeals held there is no
such preclusion.o
The facts of Ramos-Silva were as follows: Mary Reddy was injured in
a motor vehicle collision involving Ramos-Silva. Ramos-Silva's liability
insurer paid Reddy its $25,000 policy limit in exchange for a limited
In signing the release, Reddy agreed "to the
liability release."
The agreement
provisions set forth in [O.C.G.A.] § 33-24-41.1."
released Ramos-Silva's liability insurer completely and released RamosSilva from personal liability except to the extent other insurance
coverage was available that covered Reddy's claims against Ramos-Silva.
State Farm paid Reddy $75,000 under the UM coverage of her policy.

34. See Ramos-Silva, 300 Ga. App. at 699, 686 S.E.2d at 346.
35. See O.C.G.A. § 33-24-41.1(bX2).
36. O.C.G.A. § 33-7-11(f) (2000 & Supp. 2010).
37. Id. Section 33-7-11(f) provides UM insurers with a right to subrogation. The
statute provides that "[a]n insurer paying a claim under the (required UMI endorsement
or provisions .. . shall be subrogated to the rights of the insured to whom the claim was
paid against the person causing such injury, death, or damage to the extent that payment
was made .... . Id.
38. Landrum v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 241 Ga. App. 787, 788,527 S.E.2d 637,
638 (2000).
39. O.C.GA § 33-24-41.1(bX2).
40. Ramos-Silua, 300 Ga. App. at 700, 686 S.E.2d at 347.
41. Id. at 699, 686 S.E.2d at 346.
42. Id. Under § 33-24-41.1(bXl), the limited release releases "the settling carrier from
all liability from any claims of the claimant" and releases "the insured tort-feasor covered
by the policy of the settling carrier from all personal liability ... except to the extent other
insurance coverage is available which covers such claim or claims." O.C.G.A. § 33-2441.1(bXl). Under § 33-24-41.1(c), a UMC cannot prohibit its insured from settling any
claim with a tortfessor's liability insurer, nor can a UMC require its permission to settle
any claim. O.C.GA § 33-24-41.1(c).
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State Farm then sued Ramos-Silva to recover the $75,000 paid to Reddy.
The trial court denied Ramos-Silva's motion for summary judgment,
which asserted that the limited release barred State Farm's action."
The court of appeals affirmed."
The court of appeals applied the rules of statutory construction and
concluded that the subrogation right created in O.C.G.A. § 33-7-11(f)
survives the execution of a limited liability release under O.C.G.A. § 3324-41.1." The court provided three reasons for this result. First,
granting Ramos-Silva's motion would render O.C.G.A. § 33-24-41.1(d)(3)
meaningless because it "provides that the execution of a limited release
does not in any way affect the duty that the settling insurer otherwise
has to defend its insured in a subrogation action."" Second, construing
O.C.G.A. § 33-24-41.1 as extinguishing the subrogation right granted in
O.C.G.A. § 33-7-11(f) would create a conflict between the statutes.
Finally, this result is consistent with the equitable purpose of subrogation, which is to deter wrongdoing by placing responsibility for payment
on the tortfeasor." Therefore, the court of appeals held that State
Farm could sue Ramos-Silva for recovery of the $75,000 UM payment
made to its insured."'
8. Insured Must Obtain a Judgment Against the Uninsured
Motorist, but Requirement Can Be Waived. During this survey
period, two uninsured motorist coverage cases dealt with whether an
insured's claims against his insurer were barred by O.C.G.A. § 33-7-11
when the insured had not first obtained a judgment of liability against
the uninsured motorist. A third case involving the same principle
involved a procedural remedy for the protection of insureds.
In Harden v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.,"
plaintiffs Harden and Chambers, both State Farm insureds, were injured
in two unrelated collisions involving uninsured motorists. State Farm
offered to pay UM benefits and settle in both cases but sought a set-off
for payments made under the medical-payments coverage of the policies.
Harden refused State Farm's offer and brought suit against the carrier
but did not file suit against the uninsured motorist. Chambers accepted

43. Ramos-Silva, 300 Ga. App. at 699, 686 S.E.2d at 346.
44. Id. at 700, 702, 686 S.E.2d at 347, 348.
45. Id. at 700-02, 686 S.E.2d at 347.
46. Id. at 700-01, 686 S.E.2d at 347; see also O.C.G.A. I 33-24-41.1(dX3).
47. Ramos-Silva, 300 Ga. App. at 701, 686 S.E.2d at 347.
48. Id. at 702, 686 S.E.2d at 348 (quoting Landrum, 241 Ga. App. at 790, 527 S.E.2d
at 639).
49. See id.
50. 339 F. App'x 897 (11th Cir. 2009).
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State Farm's UM payment and dismissed his suit against the uninsured
motorist with prejudice."'
The plaintiffs filed a class action against State Farm, alleging breach
of their insurance contracts." They asserted that pursuant to the
Georgia Supreme Court's decision in Dees v. Logan," State Farm was
not entitled to reduce the UM benefits it owed by payments made for
medical expenses under a separate coverage. State Farm had the case
removed to the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Georgia, and the plaintiffs then sought a certification of the question to
the Georgia Supreme Court."
The suit was dismissed in the district court because the plaintiffs
failed to meet a condition precedent to suit against the insurer-"the
insured [must] first sue and recover a judgment against the uninsured
motorist, whether known[] or unknown."" The plaintiffs argued that
this requirement did not apply to their claim against the insurer for
breach of contract." The Eleventh Circuit disagreed and affirmed the
district court's dismissal,' holding that an insured must obtain a
judgment against the tortfeasor before a UM carrier can be held liable
to the insured for damages." In so doing, the Eleventh Circuit
distinguished cases in which a direct action against a UM carrier was
allowed for declaratory judgment or coverage interpretation. 9 In
addition, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that neither plaintiff had
alleged that State Farm waived the condition precedent or misled the
plaintiffs by negotiating settlements so as to give rise to estoppel.6
Less than one month after the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Harden,
the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia,
with Judge Forrester writing the opinion, decided a case involving a
similar issue but found the facts warranted the opposite result." In
Yeagley v. Allstate Insurance Co.,6 plaintiff John Yeagley brought suit

51. Id. at 898-99.
52. Id. at 899.
53. 282 Ga. 815, 653 S.E.2d 735 (2007).
54. Harden, 339 F. App'x at 900.
55. Id. at 900-01 (quoting Cohen v. Allstate Ins. Co., 277 Ga. App. 437, 440, 626 S.E.2d
628, 631 (2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
56. Id. at 898.
57. Id. at 898, 903.
58. Id. at 901 (quoting Cohen, 277 Ga. App. at 441, 626 S.E.2d at 632).
59. Id. at 901 n.2.
60. Id. at 902-03.
61. See Yeagley v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 1:09-CV-19-JOF, 2009 WL 2486320 (N.D. Ga.
Aug. 12, 2009).
62. No. 1:09-CV-19-JOF, 2009 WL 2486320 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 12, 2009).
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to recover under his UM policy for injuries sustained in a car accident
and named Allstate, his UMC, as the defendant. Yeagley had two
policies with Allstate, a primary auto policy with UM coverage and an
umbrella policy.'
Yeagley accepted an offer of the policy limits of the tortfeasor's policy
and agreed to execute a full release. Yeagley also demanded the policy
limits of the UM coverage under his primary policy with Allstate, which
Allstate agreed to pay. Allstate required Yeagley to execute a release

that specified the policy number of the primary policy as the contract at
issue in the release." Allstate's proposed release originally contained
a disclaimer of any settlement with the tortfeasor, but after being
informed of the settlement with the liability carrier, and at the insured's
request, the release was amended to provide that "[tihis release in no
way waives the rights of the insured, [John Yeagleyl, to recover under
his umbrella policy.""
Allstate then denied the plaintiffs claim under the umbrella policy,

contending that his general release of the tortfeasor precluded any
recovery of UM benefits. The plaintiff brought suit, arguing that by its
participation in the settlement agreements, including its inclusion of the
"no waiver under the umbrella policy" language, Allstate had waived its
right to raise the coverage defense based on the settlement with the
tortfeasor."
The district court agreed and held that Allstate had waived its defense
based upon its failure to satisfy O.C.G.A. § 33-24-41.1 67-the condition
precedent of obtaining a judgment against the tortfeasor." The district
court reasoned that Allstate had waived its defenses because it knew the
plaintiff was executing a full release of the tortfeasor." Furthermore,
Allstate knew the plaintiff was releasing the primary UM claim when

Allstate drafted the release, which provided that the plaintiff's right to
recover under the umbrella policy would not be waived."o The district
court determined that Allstate's conduct was inconsistent with an intent
to require compliance with the condition precedent, stating that Allstate
was not entitled to rely upon that condition as a defense."

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id.

*1.
*1-2.
*2 (internal quotation marks omitted).
*8.
*6.
*8.
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The third case in this subject area involves a limited release, a loss of
consortium claim, and the failure to obtain a judgment against the
tortfeasor, which all impacted the insureds' UM claim. In Mullinax v.
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.,72 the plaintiff, Shirley
Mullinax, sued David English for injuries she sustained during a car
accident. Mullinax's husband, James, sued English for loss of consortium. The Mullinaxes served pleadings on their UMC, State Farm,
which cross-claimed against English for any sums State Farm became
obligated to pay. The Mullinaxes settled with English for the $25,000
policy limit of his liability insurance policy and released English and his
insurer pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 33-24-41.1. The limited release provided
that $20,000 was allocated to settle Shirley's claim and that $5,000 was
allocated to James's claim. One month later, the Mullinaxes filed a
dismissal with prejudice against David English. The dismissal only
applied to claims against English and not to the claims against their
UMC, State Farm."
State Farm moved for summary judgment on the grounds that the
Mullinaxes could not recover UM benefits because of their failure to
exhaust English's liability coverage limits by settling for less than the
policy limit. 4 Under O.C.G.A. § 33-24-41.1, an injured party is
permited to settle with a tortfeasor's liability insurer and proceed with
a claim against the injured party's UMC.75 However, the statute as
construed in Holland v. Cotton States Mutual Insurance Co. 76 requires
that the injured party exhaust all available liability coverage before
recovering under a UM policy.7
The court of appeals held that the plaintiffs exhausted the available
liability coverage and could proceed against their UMC." The court
relied on Thompson v. Allstate Insurance Co., 9 a case we discussed in
last year's article," which held that a liability insurer's payments for
both the husband's bodily injury claim and the wife's loss of consortium
claim exhausted the limit of coverage for bodily injury to a single person

72. 303 Ga. App. 76, 692 S.E.2d 734 (2010).
73. Id. at 76, 692 S.E.2d at 735.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 78, 692 S.E.2d at 736; 8ee also O.C.G.A. § 33-24-41.1(b)(2).
76. 285 Ga. App. 365, 646 S.E.2d 477 (2007).
77. Mullinax, 303 Ga. App. at 78, 692 S.E.2d at 736 (citing Holland, 285 Ga. App. at
366, 646 S.E.2d at 478).
78. Id. at 79, 692 S.E.2d at 736.
79. 285 Ga. 24, 673 S.E.2d 227 (2009).
80. See generally Wolff et al., supra note 1, at 180-82.
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and allowed the plaintiffs to pursue a TM claim.e" Pursuant to the
supreme court's decision in Thompson, the court of appeals concluded the
liability insurer's total liability for personal injury to Mrs. Mullinax and
loss of consortium to Mr. Mullinax exhausted the applicable policy
limit.82
State Farm also argued that the Mullinaxes could not further proceed
against State Farm because their claims against English were dismissed
with prejudice without any judgment having been entered.' Pursuant
to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-60(g), the Mullinaxes asked the trial court to
rescind the dismissal, claiming that their attorney made a clerical error
and that the dismissal should have been without prejudice. The trial
court denied the request and held the dismissal with prejudice was an
error of law, not a clerical error.' The court of appeals held that the
trial court abused its discretion in denying a rescission of the dismissal
and entered a dismissal without prejudice so as to allow a refiling of the
complaint."
4. Hospital Liens and Insurance Implications. A hot topic in
UM litigation has been the application and expansion of the rule in
Thurman v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. 8 7 to other
fact patterns.82 While the issue will soon be resolved by the supreme
court," the court of appeals has continued the pattern of expanding
Thurman to find potential UM exposure because of nonparty claims for
medical expense reimbursement.' In Floyd v. American International
South Insurance Co., the court of appeals decided that even an unpaid

81. See Thompson, 285 Ga. at 24-27, 673 S.E.2d at 228-30; Wolff et al., supra note 1,
at 181.
82. Mullinax, 303 Ga. App at 79, 692 S.E.2d at 736.
83. Id. at 76, 692 S.E.2d at 735.
84. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-60(g) (2006).
85. Mullinax, 303 Ga. App. at 77, 692 S.E.2d at 735-36.
86. Id. at 80, 692 S.E.2d at 737.
87. 278 Ga. 162, 598 S.E.2d 448 (2004).
88. See generally FRANK E. JENKINS III & WALLACE MILLER III, GEORGIA AUTOMOBILE
INSURANCE LAW § 32:3 (2009-2010 ed.).
89. The Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari in Adams v. State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Co., 298 Ga. App. 249, 679 S.E.2d 726 (2009), on January 11, 2010.
The issue before the supreme court is whether the court of appeals erred in extending the
rationale of Thurman to the satisfaction of a hospital lien by the tortfeasor's liability
insurer. See generally id. at 251-54, 679 S.E.2d at 728-29.
90. See Floyd v. Am. Int'l S. Ins. Co., 298 Ga. App. 771, 681 S.E.2d 216 (2009); Adams,
298 Ga. App. at 251-54, 679 S.E.2d at 728-29.
91. 298 Ga. App. 771, 681 S.E.2d 216 (2009).
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hospital lien can reduce available liability coverage and create UM
exposure. 2
Donna Floyd was injured in an automobile wreck. The owner and
driver of the other vehicle were named insureds in a policy issued by
United Automobile Insurance Company (United). In exchange for a
limited release, United paid Floyd its $25,000 policy limit. Floyd sued
the owner and driver for additional damages and served her UM carrier,
American International South Insurance Company (American).'
American moved for summary judgment, claiming that Floyd's UM
policy limits were equal to the $25,000 coverage limit of the tortfeasor's
liability policy, which was previously paid to Floyd." Floyd argued
that because an outstanding hospital lien reduced the liability coverage
available, the tortfeasor was underinsured.'
Pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 33-7-11(b)(1)(D)(ii)," an "uninsured motor
vehicle" can include a vehicle that is insured but has policy limits less
than the insured's UM limits (an underinsured vehicle) and
for this purpose available coverages under the bodily injury liability
insurance and property damage liability insurance coverages on such
motor vehicle shall be the limits of coverage less any amounts by which

the maximum amounts payable under such limits of coverage have, by
reason ofpayment of other claims or otherwise, been reduced below the
limits of coverage.'

The trial court found the tortfeasor "was not 'uninsured' ... because the
'difference between the available coverages under the bodily injury
liability insurance and property damage liability insurance coverages ...
and the limits of the uninsured motorist coverage provided under the
insured's motor vehicle insurance policy' was zero.'" Floyd appealed."

92. See id. at 773, 681 S.E.2d at 218.
93. Id. at 771-72, 681 S.E.2d at 217.
94. Id. at 772, 681 S.E.2d at 217.
95. Id. at 773, 681 S.E.2d at 218.
96. O.C.G.A. § 33-7-11(bX)(1DXii) (2000 & Supp. 2010).
97. Floyd, 298 Ga. App. at 772, 681 S.E.2d at 217; see also O.C.G.A. § 33-7-11(bXIXD)
(ii). The court of appeals noted that the current version of the statute, O.C.G.A. § 33-711(b)(1XD(ii) (2000 & Supp. 2010), only applies to insurance policies renewed or issued
after January 1, 2009. See Floyd, 298 Ga. App. at 772 n.4, 681 S.E.2d at 217 n.4. In Floyd
the insurance policy was issued to Donna Floyd prior to January 1,2009. See id. at 771-72,
681 S.E.2d at 217.
98. Floyd, 298 Ga. at 772-73, 681 S.E.2d at 218.
99. Id. at 772, 681 S.E.2d at 217.
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In Adams v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.,1c" the
court of appeals held that there is a reduction in the available liability
coverage "by reason of payment of other claims or otherwise" when part
of a tortfeasor's insurance proceeds are used to pay a hospital lien.'o"
The court of appeals held that the facts in Floyd were similar to those
in Adams, even though the hospital lien in Floyd had not been paid by
anyone, because the hospital may recover the amount of its lien directly
from Floyd if it shows that the tortfeasor paid Floyd damages. 0 2
B. Issues in Liability Coverage

1. Multiple Separate Impacts May Be a Single "Accident." In
State Auto Property & Casualty Co. v. Matty," a 4-3 decision, the
Georgia Supreme Court answered a certified question from the United
States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia and adopted the
"cause theory" to determine whether a series of events is a single
accident or multiple accidents."' The following question was one of
first impression in Georgia:e
Whether the liability insurance available for separate and distinct
claims arising from an incident where the insured struck two claimants
separately but in close temporal and spatial proximity to each other is
limited to the single per "accident" limit in the policy when "accident"
is not expressly defined in the policy.'s
The tortfeasor, Griffin, struck and killed a bicyclist, Matty. Soon
afterward, Griffin's vehicle struck and seriously injured a second
bicyclist, Davis. Georgia State Patrol investigators believed the
passenger side of Griffin's car was on the shoulder after the first impact
and that Griffin corrected her vehicle to get back on the road. Investigators were unsure whether Griffin had control of her car after the first

100. 298 Ga. App. 249, 679 S.E.2d 726 (2009).
101. See id. at 250, 253, 679 S.E.2d at 727, 729 (emphasis added).
102. Floyd, 298 Ga. App. at 773, 681 S.E.2d at 218. Another interesting case decided
by the court of appeals involving hospital liens is MCG Health, Inc. v. Owners Insurance
Co., 302 Ga. App. 812, 692 S.E.2d 72 (2010). In MCG Health, the court of appeals held
that an underlying debt is required to support a hospital lien. Id. at 818, 692 S.E.2d at 78.
However, when a hospital and a patient's insurer agree by contract that covered persons
will not be billed for services, no valid hospital lien can arise. Id. at 819, 692 S.E.2d at 79.
103. 286 Ga. 611, 690 S.E.2d 614 (2010).
104. Id. at 611, 690 S.E.2d at 616.
105. See id.
106. State Auto Prop. & Cas. Co. v. Matty, No. 4:08-CV-98(CDL), 2009 WL 2216605,
at *5 (M.D. Ga. July 20, 2009).
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impact but suspected that the vehicle traveled between 95 and 115 feet
after the first impact and then struck Davis." Investigators estimated that if Griffin was traveling at 55 miles per hour when she struck
Matty, and the second impact occurred 95 to 115 feet from the first
impact, the time between the two impacts was "just over a second.""e
In an underlying tort suit, Matty's widow and Davis sued Griffin.
Griffin's automobile insurance carrier, State Auto, filed a claim and
sought a declaratory judgment to determine the scope of its liability
under its policy." State Auto's policy contained a $100,000 limit of
liability for bodily injury for "each accident."o The policy provided
that for "each accident" $100,000 "is the most [State Auto] will pay
regardless of the number of: 1. 'Insureds'; 2. Claims made; 3. Vehicles or
premiums shown in the Declarations; or 4. Vehicles involved in the auto
1
The insurance policy did not define "accident." State
accident."n
Auto argued this was one accident and that it was only responsible for
a single $100,000 payment. The plaintiffs claimed there were two
accidents and that State Auto should be liable for two $100,000
payments. n2
Matty and Davis argued that the supreme court should look to
dictionary and statutory definitions of the word "accident" and conclude
In an opinion written by Justice
that two accidents occurred.11
Nahmias, the majority rejected the plaintiffs' argument, concluding that
their construction of the term "accident" was overly narrow.114 The
supreme court also determined that the claimants' definition of
"accident" ignored the clear intent of the insurance contract "to limit
1
Instead, the court
liability in accidents involving multiple vehicles."u
considered three different approaches followed in other jurisdictions: (1)
the cause theory;n (2) the effect theory;... and (3) the event theoUltimately, the court held that when the term "accident" is not
ry.'
107. Id. at *1 & n.3.
108. Id. at *1 (internal quotation marks omitted)
109. See id.
110. Matty, 286 Ga. at 612, 690 S.E.2d at 616.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 611, 613, 690 S.E.2d at 617.
115. Id. at 612, 690 S.E.2d at 617.
116. Id. at 613-14, 690 S.E.2d at 617 (citing Appalachian Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins.
Co., 676 F.2d 56, 61 (3d Cir. 1982)).
117. Id. at 614, 690 S.E.2d at 617 (citing Anchor Cas. Co. v. McCaleb, 178 F.2d 322,
324-35 (5th Cir. 1949)).
118. Id. at 614, 690 S.E.2d at 618 (citing Shamblin v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 332
S.E.2d 639, 643 n.6, 644 (W. Va. 1985)).
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defined in an insurance contract, the cause theory will be applied to
determine the number of accidents."' The court declined to determine
whether there was one proximate cause that caused all of the damage.120 Instead, this question was left to be determined by the United
States district court.121
Under the cause theory, "the number of accidents is determined by the
number of causes of the injuries, with the court asking if '[t]here was but
one proximate, uninterrupted, and continuing cause which resulted in
When car accidents involve
all of the injuries and damage.'"m
multiple vehicles, courts applying the cause test look at whether the
driver regained control of his or her vehicle before the next impact.'
If the driver failed to regain control, then there is only one accident.'
However, if the driver regained control of the vehicle before the next
accident, the court will find two accidents."m
Based on an examination of the contract as a whole, the supreme court
determined the cause test was most consistent with the parties'
intent." Specifically, the court stated that the term "each accident"
in the policy's limitation-of-liability section suggests there can be a
single accident involving multiple vehicles and multiple injured parties
with a single, "per accident" limit of liability.'
Justices Benham, Hunstein, and Carley dissented in Matty."2s The
dissenters suggested the majority could have answered the certified
question by applying the rules of contract construction and that it did
not need to adopt the cause theory.'
They stated that the term
"accident" was ambiguous because it was not defined and thus could
reasonably be read to apply to one or two accidents." Under the rules
of contract construction, any ambiguity in an insurance contract must be
construed against the insurer.'a Thus, the dissenters reasoned that
the insurer should provide coverage for two accidents.13 2

119.
120.
121.
122.
F.2d at
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Id. at 616-17, 690 S.E.2d at 619.
Id. at 617, 690 S.E.2d at 619.
Id.
Id. at 613, 690 S.E.2d at 617 (alteration in original) (quoting Appalachian, 676
61) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 614, 690 S.E.2d at 617.
See id.
See id.
Id. at 615, 690 S.E.2d at 618.
Id. at 615-16, 690 S.E.2d at 618-19.
Id. at 617, 690 S.E.2d at 619 (Benham, J., dissenting).
Id. at 617-18, 690 S.E.2d at 620.
Id. at 618, 690 S.E.2d at 620.
Id. at 617, 690 S.E.2d at 620.
See id. at 617-18, 690 S.E.2d at 620.
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2. Can a Cancellation Notice Be Effective If It Includes an
Opportunity for Reinstatement? In Reynolds v. Infinity General
Insurance Co.," the supreme court decided whether a notice of
cancellation for nonpayment of a premium was effective when the notice
also provided that cancellation could be avoided by payment before the
effective date." On June 5, 2006, Russell Graham bought an insurance policy from Infinity General Insurance Company (Infinity) for
commercial automobiles." The premium was due on July 5, 2006, but
Infinity did not receive any premium payment from Graham." On
July 10, 2006, Infinity sent a cancellation notice to Graham. The notice
informed Graham that his insurance policy would cease at 11:59 p.m. on
the cancellation date unless Infinity received payment before that date.
The notice was titled "Cancellation Notice, Non-Payment of Premium,"
and the cancellation date of July 25, 2006, was set forth in a small box
at the top and bottom of the notice. Graham did not pay the premium,
On August 2,
and the policy was cancelled as of July 25, 2006.'
2006, Graham's son, who was driving the insured vehicle, was involved
in a collision that took the lives of his two passengers."a
The families of the passengers filed two underlying wrongful death
and survivorship actions against Graham. 39 Infinity filed an interpleader action and declaratory judgment and claimed the July 10, 2006
Cancellation Notice was effective and "that the policy was not in force
at the time of the collision."" Perceiving no clear, controlling precedent in the decisions of Georgia courts, 141 the Eleventh Circuit certified
the following question to the Georgia Supreme Court: "Is a notice of
cancellation, properly given after the premium is past due, ineffective
because it provides an opportunity for the insured to keep the policy in
force by paying the past-due premium within the statutory ten-day
period?" 42
The requirements for cancelling an insurance policy are set forth in
O.C.G.A. § 33-24-44.'4 "The statutory requirements were designed to

133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

287 Ga. 86, 694 S.E.2d 337 (2010).
Id. at 86, 694 S.E.2d at 338.
Id. at 87, 694 S.E.2d at 338.
See id. at 88, 694 S.E.2d at 339.
Id. at 87-88, 694 S.E.2d at 338-39.
Id. at 87, 694 S.E.2d at 338.
Id. at 87 n.2, 694 S.E.2d at 338 n.2.
Id. at 87, 694 S.E.2d at 338.
Id. at 88, 694 S.E.2d at 339.
Id. at 86, 694 S.E.2d at 338.
O.C.GA § 33-24-44 (2005).
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give the insurer the responsibility of doing everything within its power
to make certain that the insured is placed on notice that the insurance
coverage is being cancelled.""' Under O.C.G.A. § 33-24-44(d), an
insurer may terminate an automobile insurance policy because the
insured did not pay premiums after delivering or mailing written notice
of the cancellation to the insured at least ten days prior to the effective
date of cancellation."
The statute does not provide any specific
language required for cancellation.146 However, in order to be effective, the cancellation notice must clearly state that cancellation is taking
place. 47
The supreme court's initial inquiry was "whether [the cancellation
notice] clearly, unambiguously, and unequivocally put[] the insured on
notice that the insurance coverage at issue [was] ending."4 8 The
claimants argued the notice was ineffective because it was conditional
and not unequivocal in that the cancellation could be avoided by
payment of the premium.14 The supreme court, however, determined
that the cancellation notice was effective.o The cancellation notice
stated three times that coverage would cease at 11:59 p.m. on July 25,
2006, and the notice explained the policy would be cancelled due to
Graham's failure to pay the premium."' Thus, the court concluded the
notice was neither misleading nor confusing.'52
The supreme court distinguished earlier cases in which Georgia courts
have held a cancellation notice was merely a demand for payment and
ineffective to cancel the policy.'sa For example, in Pennsylvania
National Mutual Casualty Insurance Co. v. Person, the cancellation
notice was ineffective because the insurer mailed the notice to the
insured before the premium was due.'
In Reynolds the notice was

144. Reynolds, 287 Ga. at 90, 694 S.E.2d at 340.
145. O.C.G.A. § 33-24-44(d).
146. See O.C.G.A. § 33-24-44; Reynolds, 287 Ga. at 91, 694 S.E.2d at 341.
147. Reynolds, 287 Ga. at 91, 694 S.E.2d at 341.
148. Id.
149. See id. at 91-92, 694 S.E.2d at 341.
150. See id. at 91, 694 S.E.2d at 341.
151. Id. at 87, 91, 694 S.E.2d at 338, 341.
152. Id. at 91, 694 S.E.2d at 341.
153. Id. at 92, 694 S.E.2d at 341-42 (citing State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Drury, 222
Ga. App. 196, 200, 202, 474 S.E.2d 64, 68-69 (1996); Pa. Nat'l Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Person,
164 Ga. App. 488, 489, 297 S.E.2d 80, 82 (1982) (both holding that a cancellation notice
was a demand for payment)).
154. 164 Ga. App. 488, 297 S.E.2d 80(1982).
155. Reynolds, 287 Ga. at 92,694 S.E.2d at 341 (citing Person, 164 Ga. App. at 489,297
S.E.2d at 82).

2010]

INSURANCE

155

sent after the premium was due, so there was nothing ambiguous about
the notice.15
In addition, public policy concerns prevent a finding that a notice of
cancellation is ineffective when delivered after the premium is overdue
solely because it includes an option to reinstate coverage if payment is
States have an interest in ensuring that all vehicles are
made.'
insured at all times and in preventing coverage gaps to protect the
public, drivers, and passengers.'" States want to encourage citizens
to retain their automobile insurance coverage by giving insureds a grace
period to obtain new insurance.5 9
Ultimately, the supreme court held that the cancellation notice was
effective and that the policy was not in force at the time of the colliThe court explained that "[tlhe mere fact that the notice
sion."
contain[ed] an option for the insured to avoid the imminent cancellation
[did] not alter the clear statement to the policyholder that coverage [was]
terminated because the premium was not timely paid.""'
3. When Is a Tractor an "Auto"? Whether a farm tractor is a
"motor vehicle" has previously been the subject of appellate decisionIn McDuffle v. Coweta County," the
making in the UM context."
question arose again, but was complicated by the fact that unlike the
UM statute, the statute at issue was not remedial and liberally
construed.
An inmate in the Coweta County Correctional Institute was working
as an auto mechanic in the prison when a tractor tire exploded and
killed him. The decedent's supervising officer was in the restroom at the
time of the explosion. The decedent's estate sued Coweta County
(County) for wrongful death and negligent supervision, arguing that the

156. Id. at 88, 694 S.E.2d at 339.
157. Id. at 94, 694 S.E.2d at 343.
158. See id.
159. See id.
160. Id. at 86-87, 91, 694 S.E.2d at 338, 341.
161. Id. at 91, 694 S.E.2d at 341.
162. See Hinton v. Interstate Guar. Ins. Co., 267 Ga. 516, 516, 480 S.E.2d 842, 843
(1997). In Hinton the supreme court made the following ruling:
[WMe construe the term "motor vehicle" in [O.C.G.A.] § 33-7-11 broadly and
remedially, and hold that it includes motor vehicles that, while designed primarily
to operate off the public highways, are operating on the public highways at the
time of an accident. Accordingly, the tractor in this case was a motor vehicle for
purposes of the uninsured motorist statute.
Id. at 520, 480 S.E.2d at 845.
163. 299 Ga. App. 500, 682 S.E.2d 609 (2009).
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death happened during the officer's negligent supervision."' The
County argued it was entitled to sovereign immunity, and the trial court
granted the County summary judgment on that basis." The court of
appeals held that the County had waived its sovereign immunity
pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 33-24-5116 because the County had motor
vehicle liability insurance that covered the incident and the plaintiff's
negligent supervision claims.1 67
The insurance policy provided coverage for "bodily injury ...

that

results from the ownership, maintenance, use, loading or unloading of
The question before the court of appeals was
a covered auto.""
whether the tractor was an "auto" under the definition in the policy so
that the policy would meet the statutory requirement of O.C.G.A. § 3324-51(a)." The court of appeals concluded the tractor constituted an
"auto" because the policy was ambiguous, and the tractor was capable
of being driven on public roads.7 o
"Auto" was defined in the policy "as 'any land motor vehicle, trailer or
semi-trailer designed for travel on public streets or roads.'" 71 The
County argued that a tractor does not qualify as "a vehicle 'designed for
travel on public roads' because" tractors are not "made" for that
purpose.172 The plaintiffs argued that a tractor is an "auto" because

164. Id. at 501, 682 S.E.2d at 611.
165. Id. at 500-01, 682 8.E.2d at 611.
166. O.C.G.A. § 33-24-51 (2005). This accident occurred in 2003, so the previous
version of O.C.G.A. § 33-24-51(b), O.C.G.A. § 33-24-51(b) (1996) (current version at
O.C.G.A. § 33-24-51 (b) (2005)), applied. McDuffie, 299 Ga. App. at 502,682 S.E.2d at 61112. The previous version of O.C.G.A. § 33-24-51(b) provided the followingWhenever a municipal corporation, a county, or any other political subdivision of
this state shall purchase the insurance authorized by subsection (a) of this Code
section to provide liability coverage for the negligence of any duly authorized
officer, agent, servant, attorney, or employee in the performance of his official
duties, its governmental immunity shall be waived to the extent of the amount of
insurance so purchased. Neither the municipal corporation, county, or political
subdivision of this state nor the insuring company shall plead governmental
immunity as a defense; and the municipal corporation, county, or political
subdivision of this state or the insuring company may make only those defenses
which could be made if the insured were a private person.
O.C.G.A. § 33-24-51(b) (1996) (current version at O.C.G.A. § 33-24-51(b) (2005)); McDuffle,
299 Ga. App. at 502 n.2, 682 S.E.2d at 612 n.2.
167. McDuffie, 299 Ga. App. at 501-03, 682 S.E.2d at 611-12.
168. Id. at 502, 682 S.E.2d at 612 (internal quotation marks omitted).
169. Id. at 503, 682 8.E.2d at 612-13.
170. Id. at 504, 682 S.E.2d at 613.
171. Id.
172. Id.

20101

INSURANCE

157

it is capable of traveling on public roads."'3 The court of appeals determined that both arguments were reasonable, and as a result of this
ambiguity, the court construed the term "auto" against the insurer."'
The court concluded that because the tractor was capable of being
operated on public roads, it was a covered "auto."" Accordingly, there
was insurance coverage for the incident, and the County's sovereign
immunity was waived.7"
4. Territorial Exclusion Upheld. During this survey period, the
court of appeals addressed the following question: may an insurer and
insured contract for liability coverage limited to use of the insured
vehicle within a specific geographic area?"' In Sapp v. Canal Insurance Co.,' the court of appeals held that a "Limitation of Use"
endorsement that limited the use to a fifty-mile radius was valid;17 9
thus, when an accident occurred outside of the covered area, coverage
was excluded.'
The Sapps sued David Lamb and his employer for
injuries arising out of an automobile wreck between Pamela Sapp's
vehicle and a dump truck that Lamb was driving. Canal Insurance
Company, the defendants' insurer, filed an action for declaratory
judgment to resolve coverage issues."1
Canal's automobile liability policy included an endorsement that
limited coverage to a specific geographic area.'
The endorsement
provided that "[iTn consideration of the premium charged for policy to
which this endorsement is attached, it is understood and agreed that
insurance applies only while the respective vehicles are operated within
the radius indicated for each vehicle."'s The endorsement then listed
the dump truck as the vehicle, the location of the garage as Tifton,
Georgia, and the coverage area as fifty miles. The named insured,
Lamb's employer, received an insurance premium reduction because of
the limitation endorsement."
It was undisputed that the accident
occurred outside the fifty-mile radius measured from the garage in

173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 502-04, 682 S.E.2d at 612-14.
Sapp v. Canal Ins. Co., 301 Ga. App. 596, 688 S.E.2d 375 (2009).
301 Ga. App. 596, 688 S.E.2d 375 (2009).
Id. at 598, 688 S.E.2d at 377.
Id. at 597, 688 S.E.2d at 376.
Id. at 596-97, 688 S.E.2d at 376.
Id. at 597, 688 S.E.2d at 376.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
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Tifton; thus, the trial court granted summary judgment in Canal's
favor. 18
The court of appeals rejected the claimants' argument that the
exclusion was unenforceable.16 The court determined the fifty-mile
radius exclusion to be acceptable, reasoning that "[tihe parties contracted for th[e] exclusion, the exclusion is not prohibited by statute or public
policy, and the Sapps still ha[d] access to their [UM] coverage" so that
there would be a recovery for their losses.'
III.

A.

COMMERCIAL GENERAL LIABILITY POLICY

Bad FaithFailureto Settle

In an important case with significant ramifications for future bad faith
actions, the Georgia Supreme Court in Fortner v. Grange Mutual
Insurance Co." addressed the interpretation of the "safe harbor"
doctrine espoused in Cotton States Mutual Insurance Co. v. Bright-

man" by the supreme court in 2003." The plaintiff was injured
in an automobile accident caused by the insured. The insured had a
liability policy with Grange Mutual Casualty Company (Grange Mutual)
with a limit of $50,000, and his business had a liability policy with Auto
Owners Insurance Company (Auto Owners) with a limit of $1 million.
The plaintiff offered to settle the claims for the limits under the Grange
Mutual Policy, contingent upon a $750,000 payment by Auto Owners.91 Grange Mutual indicated that it would pay its limits "contingent upon [the plaintiffs] 'signing a full release with indemnification
language' and dismissing his claim against [the insured] with prejudice."l92 The plaintiff proceeded to trial and obtained a $7 million
verdict against the insured."' The plaintiff then "brought a bad faith
claim against Grange [Mutual].""' The question for the supreme court

185. Id.
186. Id. at 598, 688 S.E.2d at 377.
187. Id.
188. 286 Ga. 189, 686 S.E.2d 93 (2009).
189. 276 Ga. 683, 580 S.E.2d 519 (2003). See Cotter et al., Insurance,Annual Survey
of Georgia Law, 55 MERCER L. REV. 277, 293-99 (2003) for a discussion of the decision in
Brightman.
190. Fortner, 286 Ga. at 189, 686 S.E.2d at 94.
191. Id.

192. Id.
193. Id.

194. Id.
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was whether the jury charge given in that lawsuit accurately reflected
the Brightman "safe harbor" provision.19 5
In holding that the jury charge was not consistent with the "safe
harbor" provision as adjusted to the evidence of the case," the
supreme court reiterated the purpose behind the provision: "In short,
Brightman's 'safe harbor' provision protects an insurer from liability
under the reasonableness standard based on an allegation that it failed
to satisfy a settlement condition over which it had no control.""' In
Brightman the supreme court held that
when a settlement offer contains a condition beyond an insurer's
control, the insurer can create a "safe harbor from liability for an
insured's bad faith claim ... by meeting the portion of the demand

over which it has control, thus doing what it can to effectuate the
settlement of the claims against its insured.""'s
In Fortner, had "Grange [Mutual] responded to the settlement
condition beyond its control .. . by offering its policy limits," it would

have satisfied the a "safe harbor" standard."' Grange Mutual could
not rely on a "safe harbor" in this case, though, because it conditioned
its acceptance of the plaintiff's offer on the plaintiffs agreeing to a
complete release of the insured with indemnification language and
dismissing the plaintiff's claim with prejudice against the insured, which
would have potentially caused the plaintiff to forfeit his access to the $1
million in limits under Auto Owners' policy.'
Grange Mutual's
conditions to settle were clearly within its control."e' The supreme
court noted that if it were to hold otherwise, then
if two or more insurers are involved in a case and the plaintiff makes
a settlement offer to one insurer that conditions settlement on another
insurer also settling, the first insurer could, as a matter of law, avoid
a bad faith claim by offering its policy limits but making the offer
contingent on unreasonable conditions that a plaintiff is guaranteed to
reject.=

195.
196.
197.
198.
522).
199.
200.
201.
202.

Id.
Id. at 189-90, 686 S.E.2d at 94.
Id. at 190-91, 686 S.E.2d at 95 (emphasis omitted).
Id. at 190, 686 S.E.2d at 95 (quoting Brightman, 276 Ga. at 687, 580 S.E.2d at
Id. at 191, 686 S.E.2d at 95.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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According to the court, the jury charge was defective because it did not
allow the jury to consider whether the conditions Grange Mutual placed
upon its response to the plaintiff's settlement demand were reasonable.m
The supreme court's decision in Fortner demonstrates that the "safe
harbor" doctrine is not so safe when an insurer responds to a settlement
demand with any contingencies beyond that demand, even though the
insurer agrees to pay its limits. The key factor influencing the court's
holding in Fortnerwas Grange Mutual's condition that the plaintiff enter
into a release with indemnification language, which could have
effectively prevented the plaintiff from continuing to pursue the limits
Fortner potentially places insurers in a
under the insurer's policy.'
"catch 22" situation. On the one hand, it would be in the insured's best
interest for the insurer to seek a full release of all claims, including
indemnification for future claims by a third-party, thereby preventing
any further exposure to the insured. Obtaining full releases is standard
practice upon settlement of a liability case. On the other hand, to
require such a full release risks a rejection by the plaintiff, thereby
exposing the insurer to a verdict beyond policy limits.
Fortner begs the question of whether an insured could bring a bad
faith action against an insurer if the insurer settles the case for policy
limits without a full release and indemnification, and the insured is later
sued by a third-party, leaving the insured exposed without any
insurance for the third-party claim. Based on Fortner, the better
practice is to pay the limits of the policy so long as doing so is reasonably justified under the evidence of the case. The insurer would have a
strong argument that when the plaintiff has made a policy-limits
demand, the risk of a verdict beyond policy limits outweighs the risk of
a later lawsuit by a third-party against an insured for which the insured
has no remaining insurance coverage.
Taking a somewhat different approach, the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Georgia provided further cautionary
guidance to insurers who add contingencies to a response to a settlement
demand. In Butler v. First Acceptance Insurance Co.," the plaintiff
was injured by the insured when he was pinned against a garbage truck
by the insured's vehicle. The insured's policy with First Acceptance had
limits of $25,000. The plaintiff made a time-sensitive settlement
demand for the amount of the limits in exchange for a limited release.

203. Id.
204. See id.
205. 652 F. Supp. 2d 1264 (N.D. Ga. 2009).
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First Acceptance responded that it would settle for its policy limits,
contingent upon protection from hospital liens and a waiver of subrogation from the workers' compensation carrier of the plaintiff's employer.
The plaintiff treated such contingencies as a counter offer and, therefore,
a rejection of the settlement demand. The case went to trial, the
plaintiff obtained a consent judgment for $3.25 million, and the insured
assigned her rights against the insurer to the plaintiff.'
With respect to First Acceptance's contention that common-law
negligence theories conflict with Georgia-law standards for tortious
failure to settle, the district court wrestled with the concept of an
insurer's negligent failure to settle versus the concept of an insurer's bad
faith failure to settle.2 ' The district court acknowledged that Georgia
law remains unsettled in regards to the difference between the torts of
negligent and bad faith failure to settle but suggested that the difference
may not matter in the end because the question was just a case of
semantics with the same result."
The district court then addressed whether First Acceptance's response
to the plaintiffs settlement demand was a true counter offer and
In reliance upon Frickey v. Jones,210 a breach of contract
rejection.'
case that did not involve a tortious failure to settle, the district court
held that the conditions First Acceptance placed on its response to the
settlement demand were a counter offer.21" A jury would have to
determine from the evidence whether First Acceptance acted as an
ordinarily prudent insurer or whether it placed its own interests above
the interests of its insured by failing to accept the plaintiffs settlement

demand. 2 12
Although they used different means to reach the same result, Fortner
and Butler both stand for the proposition that an insurer risks a
potential claim for tortious failure to settle, bad faith failure to settle,
or both when it does not accept a plaintiff's demand for policy limits at
face value. When Butler is read in conjunction with Fortner,it follows
that an insurer can only take advantage of Brightman's "safe harbor" if
its acceptance of the plaintiff's settlement demand is "unequivocal[] and
without variance of any sort."213 This conclusion again places the

206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.

Id. at 1266-69.
Id. at 1273-76.
Id. at 1275-76.
Id. at 1277.
280 Ga. 573, 630 S.E.2d 374 (2006).
Butler, 652 F. Supp. 2d at 1277.
Id.
See id. at 1276 (quoting Frickey, 280 Ga. at 574, 630 S.E.2d at 376).
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insurer in a difficult position, as an insurer typically will want to make
sure all hospital, medical, and workers' compensation liens are the
responsibility of the plaintiff in order to protect its insured from any
such outstanding liens. However, by doing so the insurer risks a
potential revocation of the settlement demand and a claim that it did not
protect its insured by exposing him to a judgment in excess of policy
limits.

B. Failureto Issue 7lmely Reservation of Rights
In World Harvest Church, Inc. v. GuideOne Mutual Insurance Co.,2 14
the insurer provided a defense to the insured in a lawsuit for over ten
months. Subsequently, without issuing a reservation of rights, the
insurer withdrew its defense because there was no coverage under the
commercial general liability (CGL) policy. It was undisputed that the
policy did not provide coverage. A sister company of the insurer had
previously issued a written reservation of rights to the insured in a
similar lawsuit under a separate policy. The United States District
Court for the Northern District of Georgia held that the insurer could
still raise coverage defenses to the subject lawsuit against the insured,
and that the insurer had not waived such defenses by failing to issue a
written reservation of rights when providing a defense to the insured
because the insured had not shown it was prejudiced.2 16 On appeal,
the Eleventh Circuit certified the following questions applicable to our
discussion:
(1) Does an insurer effectively reserve its right to deny coverage if it
informs the insured that it does "not see coverage," after the insured
had received a written reservation of rights from the insurer's sister
company in a similar lawsuit in another jurisdiction, or is a written or
more unequivocal reservation of rights required?
(2) When an insurer assumes and conducts an initial defense without
notifying the insured that it is doing so with a reservation of rights, is
the insurer estopped from asserting the defense of noncoverage only if
the insured can show prejudice, or is prejudice conclusively presumed? 16

214. 287 Ga. 149, 695 S.E.2d 6 (2010).
215. Id. at 150-51, 695 S.E.2d at 8-9. For a discussion of the district court's holding in
World Harvest Church, Inc. v. GuideOne Mut. Ins. Co., No. 1:07-CV-1675-RWS, 2008 WL
5111218 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 2, 2008), see Wolff et al., supra note 1, at 197-98.
216. World Harvest Church, 287 Ga. at 151, 695 S.E.2d at 9 (citing World Harvest
Church, Inc. v. GuideOne Mut. Ins. Co., 586 F.3d 950, 961 (11th Cir. 2009)).
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With respect to the first certified question, the supreme court held
that an insurer's reservation of rights need not be in writing." An
oral reservation of rights can be effective, but it must fairly inform the
insured as to the basis for reserving its rights and that it is not waiving
its coverage defenses by providing the insured with a defense. 2 s The
insurer's statement to the insured "that it did not see coverage" was not
effective and did not fairly inform the insured of the insurer's coverage
position.2 19 Along the same lines, the prior reservation of rights issued
by the insurer's sister company to the insured in a similar lawsuit was
ambiguous and ineffective because it reserved the rights of a different
insurance company, in a different lawsuit, and under a different

policy.220
As to the second certified question, the supreme court held that when
"an insurer assumes and conducts an initial defense without effectively
notifying the insured that it is doing so with a reservation of rights, the
insurer is deemed estopped from asserting the defense of noncoverage
regardless of whether the insured can show prejudice."
However,
the court distinguished prior cases holding there was no prejudice for
failing to provide a reservation of rights because the insurer's defense
counsel had either merely entered an appearance and had not yet
assumed and conducted a defense of the lawsuit,' or the insurer had
not yet retained defense counsel.'2
Therefore, if an insurer provides a defense without issuing a reservation of rights that fully informs the insured of the basis for the coverage
defenses either orally or in writing, and defense counsel retained by the
insurer does more in conducting a defense of the insured than merely

217. Id. at 152, 695 S.E.2d at 9.
218. Id. at 152, 695 S.E.2d at 9-10.
219. Id. at 152, 695 S.E.2d at 10.
220. Id. at 153, 695 S.E.2d at 10.
221. Id. at 156, 695 S.E.2d at 12.
222. Id. at 155, 695 S.E.2d at 11-12 (citing Prescott's Altama Datsun, Inc. v. Monarch
Ins. Co., 253 Ga. 317, 319 S.E.2d 445 (1984)).
223. Id. at 156,695 S.E.2d at 12 (quoting Adams v. Atlanta Cas. Co., 253 Ga. App. 288,
290, 509 S.E.2d 66, 68 (1998)). Compare id. with Boatright v. Old Dominion Ins. Co., 304
Ga. App. 119, 123-24,695 S.E.2d 408,412-13 (2010). InBoatrightthe court ofappeals held
there was no estoppel of coverage defenses when the undisputed evidence showed that the
insured did not assume the insured's defense before giving notice of its reservation of
rights. Id. at 123, 695 S.E.2d at 412. "An insurer is not estopped from challenging policy
coverage where, as here, counsel not provided by the insurer answers the underlying tort
complaint on the insured's behalf prior to the insurer notifying the insured of its
reservation of rights." Id. at 123-24, 695 S.E.2d at 412-13.
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entering an appearance, prejudice to the insured will be presumed.2 M
Regardless of an untimely or nonexistent reservation of rights, insurers
can no longer contend that the insured must show prejudice, such as
claiming that the insurer did not provide a reasonably complete defense
or that retained defense counsel did not provide satisfactory or adequate
service. While the supreme court did not establish a bright-line rule
regarding the time within which a reservation of rights must be issued
once the insurer decides to provide a defense, based upon World Harvest
Church, it will behoove an insurer to issue a reservation of rights before
or at the time retained counsel begins to undertake activities in
conducting the insured's defense. 22
"Occurrence"in ConstructionDefect Cases
Since the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Georgia decided Owners Insurance Co. v. James'"in 2003, and since
the Georgia Court of Appeals decided SawHorse, Inc. v. Southern
GuaranteeInsurance Co. 221 in 2004, federal and state courts in Georgia
have reached seemingly opposite positions in the interpretation of an
"occurrence" in construction defect cases when an insured's faulty
workmanship causes damages. Under James and its progeny, federal
courts have held that such damages were not caused by an "occurrence"
because the defective work was not an accident, but rather an injury
"accidentally caused by intentional acts."2 " Under SawHorse and its
progeny, the court of appeals has held that if negligent construction is
alleged, then the negligent conduct constitutes an accident and is
therefore an "occurrence.""'
C.

224. World Harvest Church, 287 Ga. at 155, 695 S.E.2d at 11-12.
225. This suggestion is consistent with prior decisions holding that "[a] liability insurer
is estopped to deny coverage unless it makes a reservation of rights prior to assuming and
conducting the defense of the action brought against its insured." State Farm Mut. Auto
Ins. Co. v. Wheeler, 160 Ga. App. 523, 526, 287 S.E.2d 281, 283 (1981) (emphasis omitted)
(citing State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Anderson, 104 Ga. App. 815, 818, 123 S.E.2d 191,
193 (1961)); see also Jacore Systems v. Central Mut. Ins. Co., 194 Ga. App. 512, 514-15, 290
S.E.2d 876, 878-79 (1990).
226. 295 F. Supp. 2d 1354 (N.D. Ga. 2003). See Schatz et al., Insurance,Annual Survey
of GeorgiaLaw, 56 MERCER L. REv. 253, 260-62 (2004) for a discussion of the decision in
James.
227. 269 Ga. App. 493, 604 S.E.2d 541 (2004). See Schatz et al., Insurance, Annual
Survey of Georgia Law, 57 MERCER L. REV. 221, 230-32 (2005) for a discussion of the
decision in SawHorse.
228. See, e.g., Hathaway Dev. Co. v. Ill. Union Ins. Co., 274 F. App'x 787, 791(11th Cir.
2008) (quoting James, 295 F. Supp. 2d at 1364).
229. See, e.g., Custom Planning & Dev., Inc. v. Am. Nat'l Fire Ins. Co., 270 Ga. App.
8, 10, 606 S.E.2d 39, 41 (2004) (citing SawHorse, 269 Ga. App. at 498-99, 604 S.E.2d at
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The differing analyses of what constitutes an "occurrence" in
construction defect cases was further highlighted in three cases decided
during the survey year. In Hathaway Development Co. v. American
Empire Surplus Lines Insurance Co.,2 0 the court of appeals acknowledged that while breach of contract claims involving construction defects
are not covered under CGL policies, "negligently performed faulty
workmanship that damages other property may constitute an 'occur-'
rence' under a CGL policy."' In so holding, the court of appeals noted
that James predates SawHorse, which is binding precedent for Georgia
courts. 232
In QBE Insurance Co. v. Couch Pipeline & Grading, Inc.,2" the
insured subcontractor was alleged to have negligently performed grading
work.'
Following the rationale of SawHorse, the court of appeals
held the insured's defective workmanship constituted an "occurrence..m While the insured performed its grading work exactly as
intended and expected, there was no evidence that the insured intended
the alleged damages. 2 36 However, because the insured's workmanship
did not cause consequential damages to other property (the damages
were only the insured's defective workmanship itself), the court held the
CGL policy's "business risk" exclusions applied to prevent any coverage
for the damages.23 The decision in QBE Insurance Co. is significant
because it stands for the proposition that an "occurrence" can happen
even though there is no evidence the insured's faulty workmanship
In SawHorse and Hathaway
caused damage to other property."
Development Co., there was evidence of resulting damage to other
property.2 39
On the other hand, in State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Diner
Concepts, Inc.,24 the Eleventh Circuit continued to follow the rationale

546).
230. 301 Ga. App. 65, 686 S.E.2d 855 (2009).
231. Id. at 69, 686 S.E.2d at 860. The supreme court has granted certiorari on this
precise issue in American Empire Surplus Lines InsuranceCo. v. Hathaway Development
Co., No. S10C0521, 2010 Ga. LEXIS 380 (Ga. May 3, 2010). Therefore, the Authors
anticipate addressing this issue once again in next year's Annual Survey of Georgia Law.
232. Hathaway, 301 Ga. App. at 69-70, 686 S.E.2d at 861.
233. 303 Ga. App. 196, 692 S.E.2d 795 (2010).
234. Id. at 197, 692 S.E.2d at 796.
235. See id. at 199, 692 S.E.2d at 797.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. See id. at 199-200, 692 S.E.2d at 797-98.
239. See SawHorse, 269 Ga. App. at 494, 604 S.E.2d at 543; Hathaway, 301 Ga. App.
at 65-66, 73, 686 S.E.2d at 858.
240. 370 F. App'x 56 (11th Cir. 2010).
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of James in holding that defective workmanship, which in this case
caused an alleged breach of contract and warranty, does not constitute
an "occurrence.""
In so holding, the Eleventh Circuit stated that
"Georgia law is clear that accidental causes are unintended acts and are
different from unintended injuries resulting from intentional acts.""2 "
The alleged damage was caused by a knowing and intentional act-the
delivery of a structure built to the wrong set of plans."' Therefore,
there was no accident, no "occurrence," and no coverage. 244
So how can practitioners make sense of these divergent approaches to
"occurrence?" Even though federal and state courts apply different
theories to negligent construction defect cases, the end result is largely
consistent when the insured's work on a project causes damage to that
work itself-no coverage exists under the CGL policy. Under that
scenario, federal courts conclude that no "occurrence" has been alleged.
State courts conclude that while an "occurrence" has been alleged, the
builder's risk exclusions apply to prevent coverage. Moreover, when the
plaintiff alleges that the negligent construction gives rise only to a
breach of contract action, both state and federal courts find no "occurrence" and no coverage. It is when the insured's negligently defective
work causes resulting damage to other property that federal and state
courts' opinions continue to reach inconsistent results. Federal courts
find no coverage because no "occurrence" has been alleged. State courts
find coverage because an "occurrence" has been alleged and because the
builder's risk exclusions do not apply. Whether these views will be
reconciled in the coming years remains to be seen.
D. Interpretationof Pollution Exclusion and Fungi or Bacteria
Exclusion
For the third year in a row, a Georgia court has addressed the
interpretation of an absolute pollution exclusion in a CGL policy, which
suggests that insurers are increasingly applying the exclusion to a
variety of irritants and contaminants. In last year's Annual Survey of
Georgia Law, we discussed Reed v. Auto-Owners Insurance Co.,2 ' in
which the supreme court affirmed that carbon monoxide gas was a
"pollutant" as defined by the policy because such gas acted as an

241.
242.
243.
244.
245.

Id. at 58.
Id.
Id.
Id.
284 Ga. 286, 667 S.E.2d 90 (2008).

20 10)

INSURANCE

167

"irritant or contaminant."
This year the court of appeals in Barrett
v. National Union Fire Insurance Co."' distinguished and limited the
seemingly broad holding of Reed in interpreting whether natural gas
acted as an "irritant or contaminant."2' 8
In holding that natural gas was not automatically a "pollutant" as
defined by the policy, the court of appeals relied on the allegations in the
complaint that the release of natural gas created a lack of oxygen,
ultimately injuring the plaintiff.249 The complaint did not allege the
natural gas itself poisoned or harmed the plaintiff.o Natural gas
itself is not an irritant or contaminant as long as it does not deprive the
oxygen supply."s The court of appeals went a step further in holding
that it would violate public policy for an insurer to sell a liability policy
that excludes damages resulting from natural gas to an insured whose
primary product is natural gas when exposure to natural gas takes place
"during the normal course of an insured's business."252
In addition, even if natural gas had qualified as a "pollutant," the
pollution exclusion required that the alleged "injuries 'arose out of' the
'discharge, dispersal, seepage, migration, release, or escape of' natural
gas. 253 When the phrase "arising out of" is used in an exclusion,
Georgia courts have applied a "but for" analysis to determine if the tort
caused the injury.2" Here, the allegations of the complaint did not
establish definitively that the plaintiff's injuries would have arisen but
for the release of natural gas.2 55 Many other factors, such as third
party negligence, could have contributed to the injuries. 256
The holding in Barrett is significant because it requires insurers who
wish to apply the pollution exclusion to look beyond the nature of the
offending substance to determine if it is an "irritant or contami-

246. Id. at 288, 667 S.E.2d at 92 (internal quotation marks omitted). See Wolff et al.,
supra note 1, at 198-99 for a discussion of the decision in Reed.
247. 304 Ga. App. 314, 696 S.E.2d 326 (2010).
248. See id. at 317-19, 696 S.E.2d at 329-30 (internal quotation marks omitted).
249. Id. at 318-19, 696 S.E.2d at 330.
250. Id. at 318, 696 S.E.2d at 330.
251. Id. at 319, 696 S.E.2d at 330.
252. Id. at 319-20, 696 S.E.2d at 330-31.
253. Id. at 320, 696 S.E.2d at 331.
254. Id. at 321, 696 S.E.2d at 332. On the other hand, when "arising out of" is used
in a nonexclusionary coverage provision in the policy, Georgia courts construe the phrase
broadly to require only a slight causal connection or relationship. Id. at 321, 696 S.E.2d
at 331-32 (quoting Lawyers Title Ins. Corp. v. New Freedom Mortg. Corp., 285 Ga. App.
22, 30, 645 S.E.2d 536, 543 (2007)).
255. Id. at 321, 696 S.E.2d at 332.
256. Id. at 321-22, 696 S.E.2d at 332.
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nant."25' Insurers must also determine if the characteristics of such
substances are inherently dangerous, and if so, whether the plaintiff's
exposure to the substance itself was the single, primary cause of the
plaintiffs injuries, as opposed to the alleged negligent behavior of
anyone else." Barrett shows the importance of carefully reading the
"four corners" of the complaint in determining whether the allegations
trigger a defense under a liability policy. Had the complaint alleged that
natural gas itself poisoned the plaintiff, the result may have been
different. The court of appeals may have gone too far in finding that
selling a policy that limits certain pollutants violates public policy, as
courts have upheld pollution exclusions in liability policies issued to
insurers whose businesses commonly generate claims involving
traditional environmental pollution.9

In Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. Dillard House, Inc.,260
the insurer took a different approach. Instead of applying the pollution
exclusion to bacteria, it applied its CGL and umbrella policies' fungi or
bacteria exclusions to contend that it had no duty to defend or indemnify
the insured against a lawsuit brought by a plaintiff who died from
legionnaire's disease, allegedly as a result of bathing in the insured's hot
The nearly identical provisions excluded, in pertinent part,
tub."
injuries "which would not have occurred, in whole or in part, but for the
actual, alleged or threatened inhalation of, ingestion of, contact with,
exposure to, existence of, or presence of, any 'fungi' or bacteria on or
The exclusions contained an
within a building or structure."'
exception for "'fungi' or bacteria that are, are on, or are contained in, a
good or product intended for bodily consumption."' While the insured
largely did not dispute that legionella bacteria in a hot tub falls within
the general language of the exclusion, it did contend that the exception
Thus, the
would apply to prevent the enforcement of the exclusion.'
district court had to interpret whether the water in the insured's hot tub
was a product or good intended for bodily consumption.'

257. See id. at 319-21, 696 S.E.2d at 330-32.
258. See id. at 321-22, 696 S.E.2d at 332.
259. See, e.g., Truit Oil & Gas Co. v. Ranger Ins. Co., 231 Ga. App. 89, 498 S.E.2d 572
(1998) (holding gasoline was a pollutant under a pollution exclusion when the insured was
in the business of selling petroleum products).
260. 651 F. Supp. 2d 1367 (N.D. Ga. 2009).
261. Id. at 1369.
262. Id. at 1370.
263. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
264. Id. at 1376.
265. Id.
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In interpreting the exceptions, the district court relied upon dictionary
defnitions.266
After determining that water met the dictionary
definition of a "good," it considered whether water in a hot tub is
intended for bodily consumption.? Turning once again to the multiple
definitions of "consumption" in a dictionary, the district court concluded
that water in a hot tub is intended for such consumption because it
constitute "the utilization of economic goods in the satisfaction of
2 6 Therefore, the insurer had a duty to defend its insured in
wants.""
the underlying lawsuit.'
IV.

HOMEOWNER'S INSURANCE

Two recent opinions illustrate the difference in consequences of
misrepresentation in the application for insurance and misrepresentation
in the presentation of a claim. In Pope v. Mercury Indemnity Co., 27 0
the Georgia Court of Appeals provided a thorough analysis of the

266. Id. at 1376-79 & n.12.
267. Id. at 1376 n.12, 1379.
268. Id. at 1378 (internal quotation marks omitted).
269. Id. at 1379. The district court, though, held that the question of whether the
insurer had a duty to indemnify the insured was premature. Id. at 1373. See Wolff et al.,
Insurance, Annual Survey of Georgia Law, 59 MERCER L. REV. 195, 203 (2007) for an
analysis of why federal courts in Georgia find the duty to indemnify premature when an
underlying lawsuit against the insured remains pending (discussing Erie Indemnity Co.
v. Acuity, A Mutual Insurance Co., No. 1:06-CV-0174-TWT, 2006 WL 2048310 (N.D. Ga.
July 19, 2006), and Utility Service Co. v. St. Paul Travelers Insurance Co., 5:06-CV-207
(CAR), 2007 WL 188237 (M.D. Ga. Jan. 22, 2007)).
On the other hand, Georgia courts have held that declaratory judgment actions filed in
their courts are appropriate avenues for determining any insurer's duty to indemnify, even
if the underlying lawsuit against the insured is still pending. See ALEA London, Ltd. v.
Woodcock, 286 Ga. App. 572,649 S.E.2d 740 (2007). For a discussion of ALEA, see Cotter
et al., Insurance, Annual Survey of GeorgiaLaw, 60 MERCER L. REv. 191, 198-99 (2008).
Along the lines of federal district courts finding procedural flaws that prevent jurisdiction
ofdeclaratory judgment actions involving coverage disputes, in Auto-Owners InsuranceCo.
v. Hickory Springs Estates Homeowners Ass'n, No. 5:08-CV-049 (HL), 2009 WL 1658507
(M.D. Ga. June 11, 2009), the United States District Court for the Middle District of
Georgia sua sponte dismissed a declaratory judgment action. Id. at *1. Because of the lack
of any "actual controversy," which resulted in voluntary dismissal of the underlying action,
the question of the insurer's duty to defend was not in dispute. Id. at *2.
In Auto-Owners Insurance Co. u. Scott, No. 5:09-CV-166 (HL), 2009 WL 3011244 (M.D.
Ga. Sept. 16, 2009), the district court dismissed the declaratory judgment action because
the minimum jurisdictional amount in controversy ($75,000) was not met. Id. at *2. The
underlying complaint did not demand a specific amount of damages, and the insurer did
not provide a document clearly establishing the jurisdictional amount. Id. The district
court stated that the amount of limits under the policy alone was irrelevant in measuring
the jurisdictional amount in controversy. Id.
270. 297 Ga. App. 535, 677 S.E.2d 693 (2009).
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profound consequences of misrepresentations made in the course of
negotiation for an insurance policy.
The Popes applied for homeowner's insurance coverage through an
independent agent, Woodworth, and in response Mercury sent a
cancellation notice to the Popes due to its discovery that the Popes had
a diving board and trampoline, which were unacceptable risks for
Mercury. Nevertheless, Mercury agreed to reinstate coverage if the
diving board was removed and a photograph of the pool after removal
was received, which it was. There was a dispute in the testimony as to
whether the insureds' agent advised the Popes that the replacement of
the diving board would have voided all coverage or only coverage
relating to the use of the diving board. The Popes' property was
damaged by a tornado, and upon learning of the diving board's
replacement before the tornado, Mercury sued for and obtained complete
rescission of the policy."'
Complete rescission was affirmed on appeal.7 . because under
O.C.G.A. § 33-24-7,2' once an insurer has shown misrepresentation
material to the acceptance of the risk such that it would not have issued
the policy, all coverage under the policy can be rescinded.274 The court
of appeals specifically ruled that "the fact that the Popes' loss was
unrelated to their use of the diving board [was not] relevant in
determining whether their misrepresentation regarding the board's
removal should void coverage."'
The result reached in this case
underscores the importance of truthfulness in the negotiation for
coverage, as the extent of rescission of coverage can be altogether
unrelated to the extent of the misrepresentation.
In sharp contrast to Pope was the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Georgia's analysis of the consequences of misrepresentation in the submission of a claim in Scott v. Allstate Property &
Casualty Insurance Co.27 In Scott the district court noted that a
misrepresentation in an insurance application might have resulted in a
more profound loss of coverage than was suffered by Scott."
Allstate insured Scott's home in April 2007. Two months earlier, Scott
had been incarcerated in the federal penitentiary in Coleman, Florida.
Fire damaged the property, and thereafter, Scott's daughter, Baker,

271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.

Id. at 536-37, 677 S.E.2d at 695-96.
Id. at 535-36, 541, 677 S.E.2d at 695, 699.
O.C.G.A. § 33-24-7 (2005).
Pope, 297 Ga. App. at 537, 677 S.E.2d at 696; see also O.C.GA. § 33-24-7(bX2)-(3).
Pope, 297 Ga. App. at 539, 677 S.E.2d at 698.
No. 408CV236, 2010 WL 1254295 (S.D. Ga. Mar. 30, 2010).
See id. at *5.
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misrepresented herself to be Scott, thereby securing an insurance
advance of $2000. The total claimed loss was six figures. Allstate
moved for summary judgment, alleging that as a result of the material
misrepresentation that Scott was a resident of the premises, and of
Baker's misrepresentation that she was Scott, a policy provision
regarding concealment and fraud had been violated.278
The district court cited ample Georgia and out-of-state authority to
support its first ruling that the residence of an inmate does not
necessarily change to the inmate's place of incarceration.27 9 Since the
policy did not expressly state in the exclusion the consequence of failing
to inform Allstate of a change in occupancy and residency of the
residents, summary judgment was denied to Allstate because Scott failed
The court
to inform Allstate of the change of primary residence.2
then considered material misrepresentation in the presentation of the
claim."s Allstate's policy "would not cover any loss or occurrence in
which any insured person has concealed or misrepresented any material
fact or circumstances.'* While the district court found the misrepresentation was a violation of the policy, it also found that "Baker's
misrepresentation, however, is not material to the settlement or
a4justment of Scott's claims for personal property loss and structural
damage."'
In other words, while in Pope forfeiture of all coverage
was demanded by O.C.G.A. § 33-24-7 for misrepresentation in the
negotiation of a policy, 284 only a pro tanto forfeiture of coverage was
mandated by the terms of the Allstate policy in Scott.'
A series of opinions clarified various aspects of Georgia homeowner's
coverage law. In Archer v. Cotton States Mutual Insurance Co.,' the
carrier received summary judgment when the purported insured
transferred the property of the decedent to himself individually rather
than pursuing the claim as the legal representative of the deceased."'
Insurance claimants are frequently casual in the description of their
status and capacity of pursuing claims; for example, they may attempt
to pursue a coverage claim as an individual while really functioning as
a trustee or a fiduciary. This case illustrates the need to carefully assess

278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.

Id. at *1-3.
Id. at *2-3.
Id. at *3.
See id. at *3-4.
Id. at *3 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at *4,
Pope, 297 Ga. App. at 537-38, 677 S.E.2d at 696-97.
Scott, 2010 WL 1254295, at *5.
303 Ga. App. 878, 695 S.E.2d 329 (2010).
Id. at 878, 695 S.E.2d at 330.

172

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62

the correct status of the real party in interest before pursuing such a
claim. In this instance, an assignment of the policy would likely have
solved the claimant's problem.

In Encompass Insurance Co. v. Friedman,' the court of appeals
considered the application of the contractual suit limitation commonly
contained in homeowner's policies.m Here, the insured became aware
of a water loss emanating from an HVAC system in early September
2005 yet did not know of the ensuing mold damage until October 2005.
The insured's suit, initiated on September 15, 2006, was met with a
motion for summary judgment based upon a one-year contractual suit
limitation.'
Inasmuch as the insured was claiming an "ensuing loss"
from water damage, which was known to her as of September 6, 2005,
the one-year suit limitation ran from that date, the date of loss, not from
her subsequent discovery of the mold and mildew in October 2005."'
Therefore, the court of appeals reversed and granted summary judgement in favor of the insurer.m Because mold damage is often not
appreciated until weeks or months after an occurrence, counsel should
hasten the filing of litigation to beat the anniversary of the date of loss.
In a firearm-related "intentional act exclusion" case, the court of
appeals confirmed the proper application of this well-litigated exclusion
to the plain and unfortunate facts of Neal's shooting in Allstate
Insurance Co. v. Neal.m Here, Deputy Sheriff Neal was injured by the
deceased, Frank Sheridan, during a gun battle, which ensued from the
service of an arrest warrant. Sheridan's homeowner's carrier, Allstate,
denied coverage.'
The court of appeals agreed with the denial
because the facts did not establish an "occurrence," which has been
defined to be an "accident" by consistent Georgia law.' Neal contended that a jury question was presented as to Sheridan's intent because
there was no evidence regarding his mental state or intentions.m
The court of appeals distinguished other fact patterns wherein there
was some evidence to suggest at least ambiguity regarding intent, but
the court held that the unequivocal evidence in this case that the gun
was pointed and then shot at the injured party was sufficient to invoke

288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.

299 Ga. App. 429, 682 S.E.2d 694 (2009).
See id. at 429, 682 S.E.2d at 695.
Id. at 429-31, 682 S.E.2d at 695-96.
Id. at 431, 682 S.E.2d at 696-97.
Id. at 429, 432, 682 S.E.2d at 695, 697.
304 Ga. App. 267, 696 S.E.2d 103 (2010).
Id. at 267, 696 S.E.2d at 104.
Id. at 270, 682.S.E.2d at 106.
Id. at 268-69, 682 S.E.2d at 105.
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the exclusion as a matter of law.2 9 This case illustrates that in order
to avoid this exclusion, affirmative evidence must be developed to create
an ambiguity and, therefore, a jury question regarding an insured's
expectation or intent.
In Allstate Insurance Co. v. Harkleroad,' the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Georgia grappled with coverage
contentions concerning torts and contractual theories of recovery arising
out of Claxtons' failure to disclose termite damage during the course of
Even though the initial
his transfer of property to Harkleroad.2
"duty to defend" analysis was limited to the "four corners" of the suit
under GreatAmerican Insurance Co. v. McKemie,o due to the development of the facts during the course of the litigation, the district court
considered the expanded factual contentions of the insured in its
evaluation of coverage." The district court eliminated coverage for
either punitive damages or fraud because neither claim constituted an
"occurrence.'
Some potential remained for coverage for grossly
negligent misrepresentation and possibly for breach of contract, potential
However, the district court
questions to be decided by a jury'
ultimately held that the "business activities exclusions" contained in the
Allstate policies were sufficient to warrant exclusion of all coverage.'3
The insured argued that the court of appeals decision in Brown v.
Peninsular Fire Insurance Co. 3" applied, which involved an earlier
form of a "business pursuits exclusion" that required the activity to have
been the primary or usual business of the insured for the business
The district court pointed out that the
activity to be excluded.'
Allstate exclusions were much broader than those employed in
Brown."' Specifically, the Allstate exclusions applied to "any full or
part-time activity of any kind engaged in for economic gain."m This
case illustrates the need to focus on the particular policy language
rather than historical case law pertaining to common policy terms which
may have been refined and enhanced due to experience.

297.
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.

Id. at 268-69 & n.9, 682 S.E.2d at 105 & n.9.
No. 409CV011, 2010 WL 2076941 (S.D. Ga. May 24, 2010).
See id.
244 Ga. 84, 85-86, 259 8.E.2d 39, 40 (1979).
Harkleroad,2010 WL 2076941, at *4.
Id. at *5-6.
Id. at *6 & n.5.
Id. at *6-7.
171 Ga. App. 507, 320 S.E.2d 208 (1984).
Harkleroad,2010 WL 2076941, at *7.
Id.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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V. HEALTH & LIFE INSURANCE
"Quando aliquid prohibetur et omne, per quod devenitur ad illud"3 *
was the moral of the story in Lawson v. Life of the South Insurance

Co.s31 A credit life insurance carrier was foiled in its attempt to
require the plaintiffs to submit their claims for refunds of unearned
premium to arbitration per an arbitration agreement contained within
a retail installment sales contract, which was executed at the same time
the insurance certificate was signed."' As Judge Sands put it, the
disposition of the motion to compel arbitration "involves the intersection
of three statutes":?1 " the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA);313 Georgia's
Arbitration Act;" and the McCarran-Ferguson Act (MFA).3'r
The first statute evidences a liberal federal policy encouraging
arbitration;1 e the second is a state law exempting "[any contract of
insurance" from arbitration;1 . and the third precludes preemption by
an act of Congress of any state law regulating insurance "unless such
Act specifically relates to the business of insurance."1 8 The United
States Court for the Middle District of Georgia noted that the FAA has
broad application and thus does not specifically relate to the business of
After the court found there was no federal preempinsurance.1
tion, 2 o the question became whether an arbitration clause in a retail
installment contract that is contemporaneously executed with the
certificate of insurance was within the ambit of "[any contract of
insurance."32 1
Guided by the Georgia Supreme Court's decision in Love v. Money
Tree, Inc.,"' the district court carefully considered precedent concern-

ing the intended scope of the Georgia Arbitration Act.323 In Love the
309. Lawson v. Life of the S. Ins. Co., No. 4:06-CV-42 (WLS), 2010 WL 3719618 (M.D.
Ga. Mar. 31, 2010) (quoting Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. 277, 288 (1866)) ("'[The
maxim[] that what cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly.'").
310. No. 4:06-CV-42(WLS) (M.D. Ga. Mar. 31, 2010).
311. Id. at *1.
312. Id. at *3.
313. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
314. O.C.G.A. § 9-9-2(c) (2007 & Supp. 2010).
315. 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (2006); Lawson, 2010 WL 1416551, at *3-4.
316. Lawson, 2010 WL 1416551, at *3; see 9 U.S.C. § 2.
317. Lawson, 2010 WL 1416551, at *3; see also O.C.G.A. § 9-9-2(c).
318. Lawson, 2010 WL 1416551, at *4; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b).
319. Lawson, 2010 WL 1416551, at *4.
320. Id.
321. See id. at *5.
322. 279 Ga. 476, 614 S.E.2d 47 (2005).
323. Lawson, 2010 WL 1416551, at *4.
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supreme court considered an analogous fact pattern and ultimately held
that a contract of insurance includes "a State law that prohibits the
arbitration of disputes involving insurance. 324 It was pivotal in the
district court's reasoning in Lawson that the sales contracts and
insurance documentation were executed at the same time, again
following supreme court precedent establishing "lwihere instruments are
executed at the same time in the course of the same transaction, they
Tb reiterate, the moral of
should be read and construed together."
the story is quando aliquidprohibeturet omne, per quod devenitur ad
illud.
VI.

ACCIDENT & HEALTH INSURANCE

Insurers and insureds continue the battle for the settlement dollar in
personal injury actions. This survey year, insurers effectively used the
Deemer Clause of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA)r2 to trump O.C.G.A. § 33-24-56.1327 Georgia's strong
anti-subrogation or "make-whole" statute, which would otherwise
prohibit a health insurer from recouping payments made from its
insured after the insured recovers in tort. 28 In Brown & Williamson
lbbacco Corp. v. Collier,9* the United States District Court for the
Middle District of Georgia sided with the United States Courts of
Appeals for the Fourth, Fifth, Seventh and Tbnth Circuits in holding
that "other appropriate equitable relief" included a claim to money
specifically identifiable as proceeds from tort recovery as reimbursement
for medical benefits that were within the possession, custody, and control
of the insured.no Generally, the Savings Clause of ERISA3 3 ' would
allow a state law, such as O.C.G.A. § 33-24-56.1, to escape federal
preemption, but the Deemer Clause exempts from this Savings Clause
"self-funded" ERISA plans, such as Brown & Williamson's plan.332
This is the exception, not the rule, in real life.
Despite ERISA preemption, the insured argued that the Eleventh
Circuit "make-whole" doctrine applied, but here the district court found

324. Id. (quoting Love, 279 Ga. at 479, 614 S.E.2d at 50) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
325. Id. at *5 (quoting Hardin v. Great N. Nekoosa Corp., 237 Ga. 594, 597,229 S.E.2d
371, 374 (1976)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
326. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2XB) (2006).
327. O.C.G.A. § 33-24-56.1 (2005).
328. See O.C.GA § 33-24-56.1.
329. No. 5:09-cv-00125(HL), 2010 WL 1487772 (M.D. Ga. Apr. 13, 2010).
330. Id. at *34 (internal quotation marks omitted).
331. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(bX2XA).
332. Brown & Williamson, 2010 WL 1487772, at *4.
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that under the Eleventh Circuit's rule, the ERISA plan could still
override the make-whole default doctrine because Brown & Williamson's
self-funded program explicitly rejected the make-whole doctrine.'
This case demonstrates that a well-drafted, self-funded ERISA plan can
avoid the make-whole doctrine, which would otherwise generally prevail
in Georgia so as to prohibit subrogation from the insured.
In a somewhat similar case, Zurich American Insurance Co. v. Keith
the Eleventh Circuit concluded that
O'Hara, Ross & Pines LLC,'
ERISA § 502(a)(3)" was an appropriate remedy for the carrier to use
to recoup.3" Additionally, the court held that when the plan provided
for it, "regardless of whether [the] covered person has been fully
compensated or made whole," the make-whole default doctrine was
inapplicable and the plan must be enforced as written." The court
rejected the insured's public policy arguments, emphasizing several
ERISA public policies: "to protect contractually defined benefits" and to
encourage employers to offer "welfare benefit plans in the first
place."339 The court held that to "[rlesort to federal common law
generally is inappropriate when its application would . . . discourage

employers from implementing plans governed by ERISA."'o The
opinion did not expressly state this was a self-funded plan. Therefore,
this ruling may have a further reach than its application to the facts in
Brown & Williamson.
In Capone v. Aetna Life Insurance Co.," 1 the Eleventh Circuit set a
high standard for the ERISA administrator who acted as both a claim
evaluator and payor on the same claim. 2 Capone's claim arose out
of a diving accident involving shallow water and alcohol."" Aetna
claimed that coverage was avoided because Capone intentionally exposed
himself to the risk by voluntarily diving as he did and that even if the

333. Id. at *5 (citing Cagle v. Bruner, 112 F.3d 1510, 1520-22 (11th Cir. 1997)). "This
applies whether or not you are made whole, or the settlement or recovery designates the
recovery as including or excluding the Plan's medical expense." Id. at *2.
334. 604 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 2010).
335. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(aX3) (2006).
336. Zurich, 604 F.3d at 1239.
337. Id. at 1234.
338. Id. at 1236.
339. Id. (quoting Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 497 (1996); Mass. Mut. ife Ins.
Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 148 (1985)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
340. Id. (quoting Singer v. Black & Decker Corp., 964 F.2d 1449, 1452 (4th Cir. 1992))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
341. 592 F.3d 1189 (11th Cir. 2010).
342. Id. at 1194. The detailed facts and omissions in the administrator's factual
investigation are set forth in detail in the opinion. See id. at 1192-94.
343. Id. at 1192-93.
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injuries were the result of an accident, "no benefits were payable ...
[because of injuries resulting from] accidents caused or contributed to by
the use of alcohol.""
The Eleventh Circuit set forth a complicated, evolving, six-step
analysis for reviewing the decision of an ERISA plan administrator. "
Concluding that a "heightened arbitrary and capricious" review of the
decision was appropriate due to the administrator's conflict in this
particular situation, the court applied the six-step analysis. 346 Applying Georgia law for the choice of law provision in the plan,' the court
first determined the administrator did not sufficiently investigate the
facts of the loss, such as the depth of the water at low tide, at bigh tide,
the tidal conditions, or otherwise develop factual evidence regarding the
occurrence. " This determination led to the Eleventh Circuit's conclusion that the administrator's "denial of benefits without proper
investigation was de novo wrong." "
Turning to the alcohol exclusion, again the Eleventh Circuit concluded
that the administrator did not conduct a proper investigation.3 The
court stated that it was not enough to connect a decision to dive with
In order to deny benefits, the administrator
alleged intoxication."
must have evidence that the consumption of alcohol "caused or contributed to" the loss." This opinion should encourage ERISA administrators to conduct more thorough and relevant factual investigations before
making decisions on claims.
VII.

MISCELLANEOUS

Northland Insurance Co. v. American Home Assurance Co.3' concerned a high-stakes excess coverage contribution question, which
ultimately cost Wal-Mart over $3 million following a tractor-trailer
accident. The involved parties and carriers capped exposure for the
trucking wreck by settling the claims for $4,534,000, with Wal-Mart
paying $2,534,000'5 due to its $5 million deductible on its $10 million

344.
345.
346.
347.
348.
349.
350.
351.
352.
353.
354.

Id. at 1193 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 1195.
Id. at 1194-95 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 1197.
Id. at 1199.
Id. at 1200.
Id.
Id.
See id.
301 Ga. App. 726, 689 S.E.2d 87 (2009).
Id. at 729, 689 S.E.2d at 89.
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The other excess carrier, Northland,
policy with American Home.'
only had a $1 million excess policy and claimed it was only obligated to
contribute one-eleventh of the settlement ($321,273) and that American
Home owed the other ten-elevenths ($3,212,727).""
The key to the result was what "any other collectable insurance"
meant within the meaning of the pro-rata sharing clauses of the
By its terms, the American Home policy seemed
competing policies.
to contemplate that American Home would make first dollar payments
to later be reimbursed by Wal-Mart. For this reason, the Georgia Court
of Appeals construed the American Home policy to be first dollar
Perhaps more imporinsurance for pro-rata contribution purposes.'
tantly, the court of appeals followed the general rule "that [any
applicable deductible is relevant between the insurer and the insured
only, and does not apply to proration."m Hence, substantial deductibles will be treated as insurance, directly and indirectly, for excess
pro-rata purposes.
On the other hand, in Hancock Fabrics,Inc. v. Alterman Real Estate
I, Inc.," the court of appeals held that in the context of an application
of a waiver of subrogation clause, to receive the benefit of protection of
the waiver, there must have been a payment beyond payments made
under a deductible."e1 Hancock Fabrics (Hancock), the lessee, suffered
property damage as a result of leaks in Alterman Real Estate's, the
The losses fell within Hancock's property insurance
lessor's, roof.'
policy deductible.m The waiver of subrogation clause in the lease was
with respect to "perils insured against under any insurance policies
maintained by the parties."
While the court of appeals decision in E.C. Long, Inc. v. Brennan's,
Inc.36 required a waiver of subrogation "to the extent the injured party
was reimbursed by insurance," Hancock was a case of first impres-

355. Id. at 727, 689 S.E.2d at 88.
356. Id. at 729, 689 S.E.2d at 89-90.
357. See id. at 730-31, 689 S.E.2d at 90-91.
358. See id. at 731, 689 S.E.2d at 91.
359. Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
360. 302 Ga. App. 568, 692 S.E.2d 20 (2010).
361. See id. at 571, 692 S.E.2d at 22.
362. Id. at 568, 692 S.E.2d at 20.
363. Id at 570, 692 S.E.2d at 21.
364. Id. at 569, 692 S.E.2d at 21.
365. 148 Ga. App. 796, 252 S.E.2d 642 (1979).
366. Hancock, 302 Ga. App. at 571, 692 S.E.2d at 22 (quoting E.C. Long, 148 Ga. App.
at 802, 252 S.E.2d at 646).
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sion because the loss had not been paid by an insurer? Looking to
the New York case The Gap, Inc. v. Red Apple Cos.," the court of
appeals in Hancock concluded that there is no right to a subrogation
waiver unless the claim had been paid.' Therefore, Hancock was not
inhibited from bringing the claim for which no insurance reimbursement
was available to him.a"e As this case demonstrates, insurers may wish
to be more specific regarding what is waived when drafting such clauses.
The precise policy language did matter in Those Certain Underwriters
at Lloyds, London v. DTI Logistics, Inc.371 DTI bought motor truck
cargo coverage from Underwriters that covered cargo owned by third
parties for which a common carrier was liable. After three trailers were
stolen, a claim was submitted for the contents owned by the customers
for which DTI was liable. But by the time suit was initiated against
Underwriters, DTI had not paid any claims, and all possible claims
against DTI for the loss of the property were then barred by the statute
of limitations.3 72
In requiring that the loss be paid, the court of appeals stressed that
the precise policy language chosen by Underwriters dictated payment
even though no payment was owed to third parties. 7 ' The court noted
that Underwriters could have written the policy to require payment only
when there was legal liability of the insured to third parties. 7" Again,
the courts are parsing out justice in the insurance field based on the
verbiage the parties have chosen, regardless of the equities.
In Four Seasons Healthcare,Inc. v. Willis Insurance Services, Inc.,"
a divided court of appeals considered the application of shifting rules
pertaining to failure to procure insurance, with the majority concluding
that lack of coverage was "readily apparent." 76 Hence, exceptions to
the general rule that there is a duty to read the policy do not apply.
Here, the insureds, holding two separate policies, ultimately were sued
by shareholders holding more than 5% of the voting stock. AIG's
directors and officers (D&O) policy expressly excluded coverage for
claims brought by shareholders owning more than 5%. Indeed, AIG's

367. Id. at 571, 692 S.E.2d at 22.
368. 725 N.Y.S.2d 312 (2001).
369. See Hancock, 302 Ga. App. at 571-73, 692 S.E.2d at 22-23 (quoting The Gap, 725
N.Y.S.2d at 315).
370. Id. at 573, 692 S.E.2d at 23.
371. 300 Ga. App. 715, 686 S.E.2d 333 (2009).
372. Id. at 715-17, 686 S.E.2d at 334-35.
373. Id. at 718-19, 686 S.E.2d at 336-37.
374. Id. at 718, 686 S.E.2d at 336.
375. 299 Ga. App. 183, 682 S.E.2d 316 (2009).
376. Id. at 187, 682 S.E.2d at 319 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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declination of coverage was not contested. The issue was that the
insured failed to read the exclusion, which was considered unambiguous.3"
The insured claimed the agent was responsible under Atlanta Women's
Club, Inc. v. Washburne," contending there was a fiduciary relationship between the insured and the agent who had held himself out as an
expert in insurance and had performed an expert examination of the
policy but failed to bring this coverage limitation to the insured's
attention.** But if an examination would have made it "readily
apparent" that coverage was not present, the insured cannot pursue the
agent for lack of coverage."
The court of appeals held the "5% major shareholder exclusion" was
plain and unambiguous." Additionally, the court concluded that the
plaintiff had failed to submit sufficient evidence regarding proximate
cause of alleged failure to procure because there was no proof the agent
could have procured coverage without the 5% major shareholder
exclusion.38 2 Georgia courts have now considered a number of coverage
nuances under the Washburne standards. For now, it seems that lack
of coverage by reason of the 5% major shareholder exclusion is plain,
unambiguous and readily apparent. Given the divided court, however,
the exclusion is close to the dividing line.

377. Id. at 183-84, 682 S.E.2d at 317-18.
378. 207 Ga. App. 3, 427 S.E.2d 18 (1992).
379. Four Seasons Healthcare,299 Ga. App. at 185-86, 682 S.E.2d at 318-19 (quoting
Washburne, 207 Ga. App. at 4, 427 S.E.2d at 20).
380. Id. at 186, 682 S.E.2d at 319.
381. Id. at 187, 682 S.E.2d at 319 (internal quotation marks omitted).
382. Id. at 187, 682 S.E.2d at 320.

